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Beeler: Intermediate Scrutiny For Homosexuals

CASE SUMMARY

WITT V. DEPARTMENT OF THE
AIR FORCE

SUBJECTS "DON'T ASK,
DON'T TELL" TO
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
INTRODUCTION

"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" ("DADT") refers to the statutory U.S.
policy of excluding openly homosexual individuals from serving in the
military. It prohibits members of the armed forces from engaging in
homosexual acts, stating that they are gay or bisexual, or openly
marrying a person of the same sex. I Although the constitutionality of
DADT has been upheld several times in federal COurt,2 these cases
preceded the United States Supreme Court's holding in Lawrence v.
Texas. 3 In Lawrence, the Supreme Court struck down a Texas antisodomy statute as unconstitutional and declared that the private
homosexual conduct targeted by the law was a part of the "liberty"
protected by the substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 4
I 10 V.S.C.A. § 654( b)(I)-(3) (Westlaw 2009); see 10 V.S.C.A. § 654 (b)(I)(A)-(E)
(Westlaw 2009) (setting forth five exceptions to the general rule that a service member may not
engage in homosexual acts).
2 See, e.g., Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997); Richenberg v.
Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996); Able v. Vnited States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomasson
v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 V.S. 948 (1996).
3 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 V.S. 558 (2003).
4 See id. at 578 ("The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from
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In 2008, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reconsidered the constitutionality ofDADT in light of Lawrence. s
Pre-Lawrence, DADT had been upheld under rational-basis review. 6
However, Lawrence left unclear the proper level of scrutiny to apply to
classifications based on homosexuality.7 While the Ninth Circuit in Witt
v. Department of the Air Force did not subject DADT to strict scrutiny, it
nevertheless became the first U.S. court of appeals to directly hold that
Lawrence v. Texas requires a higher level of scrutiny than mere rationalbasis review. s

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Major Margaret Witt is a well-respected flight nurse and proudly
served in the military for seventeen years before the Air Force began its
investigation of allegations that she was a lesbian. 9 She was an
outstanding officer: she earned several medals, received excellent
performance reviews, and was even a literal "poster child" for the Air
Force, as her picture appeared in Air Force recruiting materials for
years. 10 Although Major Witt lived with her civilian partner from July
1997 through August 2003, she never informed anyone in the military
that she was gay.ll There were no allegations that Witt ever engaged in
homosexual acts while on base, or with any other member of the
military. 12
In November 2004, Major Witt received a memorandum from her
superiors informing her that the military would initiate separation

each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are
entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their
destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process
Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.");
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
S Witt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008).
6 See, e.g., Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997); Richenberg v.
Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996); Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomasson
v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 948 (1996).
7 See Witt v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 444 F. Supp 2d 1138, 1142 (W.O. Wash. 2006)
("In 2003, the Supreme Court's opinion in Lawrence expressly overruled Bowers ... without
making clear whether a new, higher standard of review is to be applied in cases involving regulation
of homosexual conduct.").
8 Witt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 527 FJd 806, 817 (9th Cir. 2008).
9 [d. at 809-10.
10 [d. at 809.
II [d. at 809-10.
12 See id. at 809; Witt v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 444 F. Supp 2d 1138, 1141 (W.O.
Wash. 2006).
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proceedings against her for violating the DADT policy.13 She could not
work, receive pay, or earn credit toward pension or promotion pending
the conclusion of the separation action. 14 Sixteen months later, in March
2006, she was notified that the Air Force was initiating a discharge
action against her due to her homosexuality. 15 She immediately
requested a hearing to contest the separation, and she brought suit a
month later in the Western District of Washington. 16 She still had not
received a military hearing when the district court issued its decision that
July, and she did not receive a military hearing until September 2006. 17
Major Witt challenged the separation proceedings at on three
grounds: that it deprived her of due process, both substantive and
procedural; that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; and that it violated her First Amendment rightS. 18 She
requested a preliminary injunction to allow her to keep going to work, to
keep working toward promotion and pension benefits, and to prevent the
government from going through with separation proceedings. 19 The
district court admitted that the meaning of Lawrence was the crux of the
discussion, and set out to determine whether it requires only a rational
basis, or something more. 20
The district court began by analyzing Major Witt's substantive due
process claim. It stated that Lawrence left questions unanswered
regarding whether the Supreme Court, in striking down an anti-sodomy
statute, had held that consensual same-sex intimacy was a fundamental
right requiring a "compelling state interest.,,21 Witt asserted that
Lawrence had so held, and she further argued that DADT should not
survive strict-scrutiny review. 22 Alternatively, Witt argued for at least an
intermediate-scrutiny analysis, which would require that DADT pass a

Witt, 527 F.3d at 810.
1d. at 810 ("When she received this memorandum, Major Witt was less than one year short
of twenty years of service for the Air Force, at which time she would have earned a right to a full Air
Force retirement pension.").
15
1d.
16 1d.
17
1d.
13

14

18 Witt v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 444 F. Supp 2d 1138, 1141-42 (W.D. Wash. 2006)
(basing her substantive due process claim on Lawrence v. Texas, and her procedural due process
claim on the fact that she still had not received a hearing even a year and a half after being
suspended).
19 1d. at 1141.
20 1d. at 1142 ("[Ilt is the meaning of this relatively recent opinion that is the focal point of
this court's inquiry here.")
21 1d. at 1142-43.
22 1d. at 1143.
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"searching constitutional inquiry" in order to be valid. 23 Witt also argued
for an "as-applied" analysis, in an attempt to show that DADT was
unconstitutional as applied to her.24
Despite claiming to sympathize with Witt, the district court refused
to use an as-applied analysis. 25 It explained that judges must use restraint
when expanding individual rights. 26 Further, it gave three reasons for its
conclusion that Lawrence did not change the validity of DADT: (1) the
Lawrence Court used language typically used in rational-basis analysis;
(2) it did not consider whether the law was narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling state interest; and (3) it was purposefully silent on the issue
of whether it was changing the level of scrutiny for private, consensual,
same-sex intimacy.27 Concluding that Lawrence used rational-basis
review, the district court chose not to overrule the pre-Lawrence Ninth
Circuit cases that had upheld the constitutionality ofDADT.28
Next, the district court dismissed Witt's equal-protection claim with
few words, simply stating that homosexuals are not a suspect or quasi-.
suspect class, and this was not affected by Lawrence. 29 It also found that
there were no violations of Witt's rights under the First Amendment or
procedural due process. 30 In sum, the district court denied Major Witt's
request for an injunction and dismissed the entire suit for failure to state
a claim. 3'
II. NINTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS
On appeal, Witt again argued that DADT violates substantive due
23 Id. She also argued that DADT should not even survive rational-basis review and pointed
to studies that show there is no support for the policy and that it actually detracts from unit cohesion
and military effectiveness by promoting prejudice and dishonesty. Id. at 1143-44.
24 Id . at 1143.
25 1d. at 1144.
26
27

Id.
Id.

28 Id.; see Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997); Philips v. Perry,
106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997).
29 Witt v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 444 F. Supp 2d 1138, 1145 (W.D. Wash. 2006).
30 Jd. at 1146-48.
31 Id. at 1148. The court stated:

Prior to Lawrence v. Texas, DADT had been found constitutional under equal
protection analysis and First Amendment case law. Similar provisions had passed
constitutional muster under substantive due process review. The majority opinion in
Lawrence did not change the framework within which DADT should be evaluated.
Accordingly, prior case law approving DADT is not affected and DADT remains
constitutional as a regulation upon individual conduct.
Id.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol39/iss3/6

4

Beeler: Intermediate Scrutiny For Homosexuals

2009] INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY FOR HOMOSEXUALS

367

process, procedural due process, and the Equal Protection Clause.32 A
majority of the Ninth Circuit panel recognized that these claims had
already been rejected under previous case law, but stated that they must
be reconsidered in light of Lawrence. 33 For reasons described below, the
court ultimately affirmed dismissal of the equal-protection claim, and it
vacated and remanded the dismissal of the substantive and procedural
due process claims. 34
A. EQUAL PROTECTION AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CLAIMS

The majority had no difficulty in deciding to affirm the dismissal of
Witt's equal-protection claim. It noted that Lawrence declined to
address the equal-protection argurnent. 35 Thus, it held that Lawrence did
not affect Ninth Circuit case law that clearly upholds DADT under
rational-basis review against claimed violations of equal protection. 36
The court in Witt took only slightly more time to explain its decision
to remand the procedural due process claim to the district court due to a
standing issue. The court noted that there was an issue over whether
Witt had yet suffered an "injury in fact," one of three constitutional
standing requirements, because Witt had not yet been formally
discharged. 37 However, the court noted that she had been suspended, and
a military board had recommended her discharge. 38
The court
determined that Witt's long-term suspension was enough of a cognizable
injury to satisfy the standing requirements for her substantive due
process and equal-protection claims. 39 However, it found that her
procedural due process claim was unripe because her alleged injury of
the stigma of a dishonorable discharge had not yet occurred-and was
not even likely to occur. 40 Thus, the Ninth Circuit remanded Witt's
procedural due process claim to the district court so that further facts
could be considered regarding the actual circumstances of her

Witt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 2008).
[d. at 811 (explaining that its task was to "consider the effect of Lawrence on our prior
precedents").
34 Id. at 822.
35 [d. at 821 (explaining that the Lawrence court declined to address equal protection, and
instead specifically addressed "whether Bowers itself hal d] continuing validity") (quoting Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574-75 (2003)).
36 [d. (citing Philips v. Perry, 106 F 3d 1420, 1424-25 (9th Cir. 1997)).
37 [d. at 811-12.
38 1d. at812.
32

33

39

[d.

40

[d. at 812-13.
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discharge. 41

B. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIM
The bulk of the decision was devoted to determining what level of
scrutiny was appropriate to apply to Witt's substantive due process
claim. The Ninth Circuit determined that Lawrence "requires something
more than traditional rational basis review,,42 and eventually settled on a
It then remanded the
heightened-scrutiny balancing analysis. 43
substantive due process claim because the record lacked sufficient facts
to determine whether DADT could be upheld under what is essentially
an intermediate level of scrutiny.44
1. Lawrence Revisited
To reach this result, the court first summarized the Supreme Court's
holding in Lawrence, quoting at length from the decision. 45 For
example, the court of appeals reiterated that "the right to make certain
decision regarding sexual conduct extends beyond the marital
relationship,,46 and that "liberty under the Due Process Clause gives ...
[homosexuals] the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention of the government.,,47 Despite its description of the rights of
homosexuals, the Ninth Circuit found Lawrence's actual language to be
unhelpful in determining the proper level of scrutiny, because it found
that the decision was "perhaps intentionally so, silent as to the level of
scrutiny that is applied.,,48 Further, it acknowledged that both parties
could rely on the decision's irresolute language to support their opposing
views. 49

42

Jd. at 813.
Jd.

43

Jd. at 819.

41

See id. at 821-22.
45 1d. at 813-14.
46 1d. at 813 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003)).
47 1d. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)).
48 1d. at 814; see id. at 816 ("The parties urge us to pick through Lawrence with a finetoothed comb and to give credence to the particular turns of phrase used by the Supreme Court that
best support their claims. But given the studied limits of the verbal analysis in Lawrence, this
approach is not conclusive.").
49 Jd. at 814 (noting that "both parties draw upon language from Lawrence that supports their
views"); see id. at 814-15. Witt argued that Lawrence requires subjecting DADT to heightened
scrutiny because it relied on fundamental rights cases, and because it emphasized the "substantial
protections" afforded to adults in matters regarding their private sex lives; the Air Force argued that
Lawrence's use of the term "legitimate interest" is the "hallmark of rational basis review," that the
44
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The court found Ninth Circuit precedent unhelpful in determining
the level of scrutiny applied by Lawrence because the circuit had never
directly addressed the issue. 50 It also did not fmd it very helpful to look
to other circuits, because only two other cases had reached conclusions
regarding the level of scrutiny required by Lawrence. 51 In one case, the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit explicitly held that Lawrence
did not apply strict scrutiny.52 The other, United States v. Marcum,53 a
case decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, also
directly addressed the implications of Lawrence. 54 In the Ninth Circuit's
view, that case applied a heightened level of scrutiny in its application of
Lawrence. 55 Marcum also concluded that courts should use an as-applied
analysis, rather than a facial challenge, when applying Lawrence. 56
Recognizing this lack of controlling precedent and Lawrence's
ambiguous language, the Ninth Circuit determined it was best to solve
the problem by analyzing what the Supreme Court actually did in the
case, rather than what it said. 57 First, the court observed that Lawrence
overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,58 a Supreme Court case that upheld a
Georgia sodomy law under rational-basis review. 59 It found that
Lawrence's reason for overruling Bowers was inconsistent with rationalbasis review: "[T]he [Lawrence] Court rejected Bowers because of the
'Court's own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake. ",60 In
the Ninth Circuit's view, it was inconsistent with rational-basis review to
focus on the liberty interest involved, rather than the basis for law. 61
Second, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that Lawrence relied on cases that
Supreme Court in Lawrence never said it was applying a level of scrutiny other than rational-basis
review, and that no court has yet held that Lawrence applied a heightened level of scrutiny. Id.
50 See id. at 815 ("Nor have we previously directly considered the implications of
Lawrence."); id. at 816 ("Nor does a review of our circuit precedent answer the question .... ").
51 [d. at 815-16.
52 1d. at 815 (citing Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804,
817 (\ Ith Cir. 2004)).
53 United States v. Marcum, 60 MJ. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
54 Witt, 527 F.3d at 816.
55 Id. ("By considering whether the policy applied properly to a particular litigant, rather than
whether there was a permissible application of the statute, the court necessarily required more than
hypothetical justification for the policy-all that is required under rational basis review.").
56 1d. (citing United States v. Marcum, 60 MJ. 198,206 (C.A.A.F. 2004)).
57
1d.
58 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
59 See id. at 196.
60 Witt, 527 F.3d at 817 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)).
61 Id. ("Under rational basis review, the Court determines whether governmental action is so
arbitrary that a rational basis for the action cannot even be conceived post hoc. If the Court was
applying that standard ... it has no reason to consider the extent of the liberty involved.").
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employed heighted scrutiny,62 while neglecting to apply or even mention
Romer v. Evans,63 a post-Bowers Supreme Court case that applied
rational-basis review to a law pertaining to homosexuals. 64 Third, it
found that the rationale for the inquiry analysis the Supreme Court
adopted was also inconsistent with rational-basis review: it was not
necessary for the Lawrence court to consider whether there was a
legitimate state interest that would justify the Texas statute's intrusion
upon liberty, because under rational-basis review, "any hypothetical
rationale for the law would do.,,65
For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit determined that Lawrence
applied something more than rational-basis review. 66 The question then
became: what level of heightened level of scrutiny did it apply?67 The
court in Witt declined to apply strict scrutiny to DADT because
Lawrence made no mention of "narrow tailoring" or "compelling state
interests.,,68 Instead, the court looked to a different Supreme Court case
for guidance and ultimately applied an intermediate-scrutiny analysis. 69
2. Drawingfrom Sell v. United States To Require an Intermediate Level
ofScrutiny

The case, Sell v. United States,70 did not involve DADT, nor did it
involve homosexuals. Sell addressed the constitutionality of forcing
medication on mentally ill defendants in order to make them competent
to stand trial. 7I The Ninth Circuit found Sell's scrutiny level to be
instructive, and it relied on that case based on the notion that it is bound
by the theory and reasoning of a Supreme Court case, even if the facts
are not directly on point. 72
Sell required balancing the interest of the government with the
individual's liberty interests. 73 Its heightened scrutiny consisted of four

62

[d.

63 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
64 Witt, 527 F.3dat817.
65

[d.

66

[d.

67

[d.

68[d.at818.
69 [d.
70

Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).

71

See id. at 179.

72

Witt, 527 F.3d at 818.

[d. ("To balance those two interests, the [Sell] Court required the state to justifY its
intrusion into an individual's recognized liberty interest against forcible medication-just as Lawrence
73

detennined that the state had failed to 'justifY its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
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factors:
First, a court must find that important governmental interests are at
stake.... Second, the court must conclude that involuntary medication
will significantly further those concomitant state interests .... Third,
the court must conclude that involuntary medication is necessary to
further those interests. . .. Fourth, ... the court must conclude that
74
administration of the drugs in medically appropriate.

The Ninth Circuit found that Sell's analysis was similar to
intermediate scrutiny in equal-protection cases. 75 As the first part of
Witt's holding, the Ninth Circuit concluded that consideration of Sell's
first three factors favored applying a heightened level of scrutiny to
DADT.76 It found the fourth requirement to be inapplicable because it
was specific to the medical context. 77 Thus, the court of appeals
summarized its heightened scrutiny as follows:
We hold that when the government attempts to intrude upon the
personal and private lives of homosexuals, in a manner that implicates
the rights identified in Lawrence, the government must advance an
important governmental interest, the intrusion must significantly
further that interest, and the intrusion must be necessary to further
that interest. 78

The second part of Witt's holding was the court's decision that the
heightened level of scrutiny it adopted was to be analyzed as applied to
Major Witt, rather than facially.79
It expressly found Beller v.
MiddendorJ,8o a case in which the Ninth Circuit declined to perform an
as-applied analysis, to be overruled. 8l It found Beller's analysis to be
irreconcilable with subsequent Supreme Court cases that called for an
individualized balancing analysis. 82 It stated: "[W]e must determine not
whether DADT has some hypothetical, posthoc rationalization in
general, but whether a justification exists for the application of the policy
individual."') (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003».
74 [d. at 819 (quoting Sell v. UniteC: States, 539 U.S. 166, 180-81 (2003».
75 [d. at 818 n.7 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976».
76

[d.

77

[d.

78

[d. (emphasis added).
[d.

79

Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980).
Witt, 527 F.3d at 819.
82 [d. at 820 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), and
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180-81 (2003».
80
81

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2009

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 6

372

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

as applied to Major Witt.,,83
After defining the appropriate heightened level of scrutiny and
deciding how it should be analyzed, the court then had to apply its
balancing analysis to the facts of the case. It found the first factor easily
met because managing the military is clearly an important governmental
interest. 84 However, the record did not contain enough facts from which
the court could determine whether the second and third factors were
met. 85 Specifically, the Air Force's stated attempts to justify the policy
as developed in the trial-court record did not address "whether the
application of DADT specifically to Major Witt significantly furthers the
government's interest and whether less intrusive means would achieve
substantially the government's interest. ,,86 Therefore, the court of
appeals remanded the substantive due process claim so that the district
court could further develop the record on these issues. 87
C. DISSENT
Judge Canby concurred in part and dissented in part. 88 He agreed
with the majority that Lawrence requires something more than rationalbasis review, and that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint
for failure to state a substantive due process claim. 89 He disagreed,
however, with the majority's decision to affirm the dismissal of the
equal-protection claim, and more importantly, with the level of scrutiny
to be applied to both claims: Judge Canby would have subjected DADT90
to strict scrutiny.91
1. Substantive Due Process
Judy Canby stated that while Lawrence did indeed fail to expressly
state what level of scrutiny it was applying, it nevertheless made it very

1d. at 819-20 (citing Bel1er v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980».
ld. at 821.
8S ld.
83

84

86 ld.; see id. n.11 (admitting that the facts tended to support a contrary conclusion: "Major
Witt was a model officer whose sexual activities hundreds of miles away from base did not affect
her unit until the military initiated discharge proceedings under DADT and, even then, it was her
suspension pursuant to DADT, not her homosexuality, that damaged unit cohesion.").
87 d.
1

[d. at 822 (Canby, J., dissenting).
1d.
90 ld. (pointing out that "the statute's popular name appears to be a misnomer as applied to
Major Witt. She did not tel1, but the Air Force asked.").
91 1d.
88

89
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clear that it was protecting an important right. 92 He gleaned two main
points from the reasons Lawrence gave for its decision to overrule
Bowers: "first, the right to choose to engage in private, consensual sexual
relations with another adult is a human right of the first order and,
second, that right is firmly protected by the substantive guarantee of
privacy-autonomy of the Due Process Clause.,,93 He stated that even
though Lawrence "did not expressly characterize the right as
'fundamental,' it certainly treated it as such.,,94 This treatment, in his
view, requires strict scrutiny of governmental encroachment upon this
right. 95 In making this determination, he did not find it necessary for the
court to interpret Lawrence as having adopted that standard of review,
reasoning that "it is enough that the question is an open one.,,96
2. Equal Protection

While the majority pointed to Philips v. Perry as a Ninth Circuit
case that remained untouched by Lawrence,97 Judge Canby concluded
that Philips is no longer controlling. 98 He stated that its theory and
reasoning were undercut by Lawrence because the case Philips relied on,
High Tech Gays,99 was based on the outdated and overruled reasoning of
Bowers. IOO Because of this, he determined that the court was free to use
an equal-protection analysis applying strict scrutiny to DADT, and then
he explained the two strict-scrutiny approaches he believed should be
followed in the case. 101
The first approach would be based on the premise that homosexuals
are a suspect class such that governmental discrimination based on that
classification warrants strict scrutiny. 102 He reiterated that Ninth Circuit
case law holding otherwise was undermined by the overruling of

1d.
Id. at 823.
94 1d.
95 1d.
92
93

96 1d. (pointing out that "[cJertainly nothing in Lawrence
can reasonably be read as
forbidding the application of strict scrutiny to statutes attaching severe consequences to homosexual
behavior."); see id. n.2 ("Lawrence is to be contrasted with cases of gender discrimination, where
the Supreme Court has expressly specified an intermediate standard of review.").
97 1d. at 821 (majority opinion) (citing Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1424-25 (9th Cir.
1997) (upholding DADT under rational-basis review against claimed violation of equal protection».
98 1d. at 824 (Canby, 1., dissenting); see id. n.5.
99
100
101
102

High Tech Gays v. Der. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
Witt, 527 F.3d at 824 (Canby, J., dissenting).
1d.
1d. at 824-25.
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Bowers. 103 Thus, in his view, the court was free to hold that
homosexuals are a suspect class for equal-protection purposes. 104
Because of their history of being subjected to unequal treatment and
stereotyping, and because of their status as a minority with immutable
and distinctive characteristics, he determined that homosexuals "are a
group deserving of protection against the prejudices and power of an
often-antagonistic majority.,,105
Secondly, Judge Canby also found strict scrutiny to be the proper
equal-protection analysis because the classification in DADT impinges
upon a fundamental right. 106 He explained: "Lawrence effectively
established a fundamental right without so labeling it. At the very least,
Lawrence leaves the question open, to permit us to recognize the
fundamental right to homosexual relations .... ,,107 He believed that it
was important for this case to include an equal-protection analysis
because he felt that the clear discrimination between homosexuals and
heterosexuals should not go unaddressed. 108
3. Judge Canby's Recommended Order of Inquiry in Further
Proceedings

Judge Canby argued for an inquiry that would first require the Air
Force to identify a compelling interest in the way it applied the DADT
statute generally, before inquiring into how the statute was applied to
Major Witt's unique circumstances. 109 First of all, he reasoned that
hearing the Air Force's justifications first might end the inquiry."o
Further, he felt this would be less disruptive to the Air Force work
environment because it would require testimony from Witt's coworkers
only as a last resort. 111 Additionally, he felt that it would provide more
protections of the right set forth by Lawrence by ensuring protections for
103

[d. at 824.

[d. Judge Canby also stated that Romer v. Evans was not a barrier to using a suspectclassification strict-scrutiny approach, finding that case did not address whether homosexuals were a
"suspect class" because the Colorado provision at issue failed even rational-basis review. [d. at 825
(citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
105 [d. at 825.
106 [d. at 825-26.
107 [d. at 825.
108 [d. at 826 ("[AJn equal protection analysis focuses the inquiry sharply on a question that
should not be ignored: what compelling interest of the Air Force is served by discharging
homosexuals but not others who engage in sexual relations privately off duty, off base, and with
persons unconnected to the military?").
109 [d. at 826-27.
110 [d. at 827.
104
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all service members.
Because the right to choose to engage in private, mtlmate sexual
conduct is a constitutional right of a high order, it must be protected
not just for the outstanding service member like Major Witt, but also
for the run-of-the-mill airman or soldier. It is thus the general
application of the statute to the fieneric service member that the Air
Force must be required to justifY. 12

In sum, Judge Canby would alter the remand instructions to first
require the Air Force to show what important governmental interests
were significantly furthered by the DADT statute, and why it is
necessary to apply the statute to any service member who maintained a
homosexual relationship off-duty, off military premises, and with a
person unconnected to the military.113 Doing so would save inquiring
into other facts of Witt's employment until the end, and it might even
make further inquiry into her circumstances unnecessary.114
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION
The Ninth Circuit itself noted that "[t]he issues posed by this case
might generate great concern both from those who welcome Major
Witt's continued participation in the Air Force and from those who may
oppose it.,,115 Since the DADT policy was introduced in 1993, the
government has spent millions of dollars discharging nearly 12,500
troops from the military due to homosexuality.116 Few laws in recent
years have been more hotly debated, and this case is likely to draw even
more attention to the opposition to DADT.
Witt's significance is already apparent because one court of appeals
has followed suit by also holding that Lawrence requires more than
rational-basis review. The case, Cook v. Gates, also concluded that
Lawrence applied an intermediate level of scrutiny.ll7 It is likely that
other circuits will follow, and Witt may very well serve as the first in a

112

[d.

113

[d.
[d.

114

Witt, 527 F.3d at 821 (majority opinion).
Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, About Don't Ask Don't Tell,
http://www.sldn.orglpageslabout-dadt (last visited Apr. 26,2009).
117 Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 56 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding that Lawrence did recognize a
protected liberty interest, yet declining to apply strict scrutiny). However, the First Circuit disagreed
with the Witt majority in one respect by allowing the service member plaintiffs to bring an as-applied
challenge to DADT. [d.
115

116

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2009

13

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 6

376

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

great line of cases that will interpret Lawrence as requiring more than
rational-basis review. This, in turn, may assist the gay-rights movement,
as more classifications based on homosexuality can be struck down
under the standard of intermediate scrutiny.
Whether or not future courts agree with this interpretation of
Lawrence, at least one survey has shown that as many as 79% of
Americans think that openly gay people should serve in the U.S.
military.ll8 Many Congressmen and former generals and admirals
support a repeal of the law. 119 Even President Obama wants to repeal
DADT.12o If DADT is repealed, it was nevertheless in existence long
enough to be the impetus for a new conclusion regarding the level of
scrutiny under Lawrence.
IV. CONCLUSION
In its determination that Lawrence did not apply rational-basis
review, the Witt decision will be regarded by some as a refreshing step in
the right direction. However, others who agree that Lawrence requires
more than rational-basis review may be disappointed that Witt did not go
further and interpret Lawrence as having allowed for a strict-scrutiny
analysis. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the case is groundbreaking
for constitutional law jurisprudence: it is the first case to take the leap
through the door left open by the Supreme Court in Lawrence.
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